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Abstract:
Information  Avoidance  (IA)  is  an  important  aspect  of  human Information 
Behaviour, which is far less often studied than its counterpoint Information 
Seeking.  Despite  this,  multiple  overviews  exist  (e.g.  Sweeny  et  al.  2010; 
Manheim 2014 or Golman et al. 2017), though there is no current overview 
within  Information  Science.  Thus  this  thesis  combines  research  from 
communication,  psychology, economics,  health and information science,  to 
create  an  overview  of  common  theories,  research-methods,  reasons  and 
appearances  of  IA  behaviour.  It  closes  with  an  overview  of  still  open 
questions. This thesis found that the definition of IA varied widely between 
researchers,  to  the  extend  that  a  single  definition  would  be  impossible  to 
create. However some trends could be identified: IA became more commonly 
assumed  to  be  predicted  by  situations,  instead  of  traits.  More  and  more 
researchers began to understand it as neutral behaviour, instead of a solely 
negative one. Topics formerly belonging to other non-seeking-behaviour (e.g. 
Information Overload or Satisficing) were researched as aspects of IA. Finally 
while many research areas (e.g. psychology, communication) combined their 
knowledge,  many more could benefit  from doing so.  There were also still 
mostly unexplored topics. These were positive IA, temporal IA, as well as IA 
Behaviour by groups or animals.
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Information Avoidance (IA) has become as a research-topic more and more relevant in
recent  years.  Scholars  out  of  different  areas,  including  communication,  psychology,
economics, health and information science have studied it (e.g. in communication: Jang
2014; Carcioppolo et. al. 2016; Bode et. al. 2017; Song 2017, in psychology: Sweeny et. al.
2010;  Fleurkens  et.  al.  2014;  Vrinten  et.  al.  2018;  Howell  et.  al.  2019,  in  economics:
Bénabou 2013; Huck et. al. 2015; Andreoni et. al. 2017; Freddi 2017; Golman et. al. 2017,
in health science: Eriksson and Helgesson 2005; Gaspar et. al. 2016; McCloud et. al. 2017
and in information science: Case et. al. 2005; Manheim 2014; Savolainen 2014; Addison
2017). Note though, that these associations are somewhat fluent. E.g. Vrinten et. al. (2018)
published in “Psychology and Health” and Carcioppolo et.  al.  (2016) in the Journal of
Health Communication, which are both not distinctly assignable. Also are often not all
authors from an article from the same area of study. So worked on Menon et. al. (2006)
two authors from economics and one psychologist. Similar in Bode et. al. (2017) where the
first  two  authors,  Bode  and  Vraga,  are  from communication  research,  while  the  last,
Troller-Renfree, is another psychologist.
However, in information science there is no recent literature review about this topic. While
Golman et. al. published 2017 their overview “Information Avoidance”, this work, despite
excellent, is still rooted in economic understanding of IA. As explored later, it has some
notably  differences  to  the  understanding  of  information  science,  (some  strings  of)
psychology and health care. For information science itself, the most recent overview would
be Manheim's article about information non-seeking-behaviour from 2014. In it, Manheim
separates  research  trends  on  non-seeking-behaviour,  a  framework  meant  to  capture  all
behaviour  intended  to  hinder  or  avoid  ones  own  knowledge  gain,  into  satisficing,
information overload and IA. However more recent research trends in IA tend to a more
inclusive definition of it (e.g. Fleurkens et. al. 2014; Addison 2017; Bode et. al. 2017 and
Song 2017). Consequently Manheim's framework is more and more in need of revision, as
IA starts to incorporate research and aspects of information overload and satisficing into
itself. Lastly, there is Sweeny et. al., which published their paper on IA 2010, which is still
relevant as a baseline today. Yet, different authors, most notably Addison 2017, did expand
upon Sweeny et. al.'s basic definition. Additional Sweeny et. al. did not include Golman et.
al.'s economic definition and many of the theories they assumed to be applicable to IA have
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been advanced in the recent years, thus making a new overview necessary.
Such a review is of even greater importance for Germany, which has neither Information
Avoidance  or  avoidance,  nor  the  German  translations  'Informationsvermeidung'  and
'Vermeidung' included in the last edition of the lexicon of library and information science
(Umlauf  and  Gradmann  2011,  2014).  Even  in  the  articles  about  'Informationssuche'
(information  seeking),  'Suchverhalten'  (seeking  behaviour)  and  'Informationsverhalten'
(information  behaviour)  the  possibility  of  avoidance  of  information  is  not  mentioned
(Hobohm  2011b,  2011c;  Luca  2014).  Only  'Informationsüberlastung'  (information
overload)  and  'Information  Satisficing'  (satisficing)  possess  their  own  entries,  with
information overload being caused by insufficient abilities and satisficing usually resulting
in inferior results (Hobohm 2011a; Umlauf 2011). Reading the lexicon, it appears that IA
on its own or for beneficial reasons is unthinkable, a notion that was even at the date of its
composition questionable. Hence an overview, created at a German university, might be of
special value.
To begin there are  different  areas  under which IA has been classified.  The first  is  the
obvious (1) information seeking-behaviour, in which IA is defined as counter to the more
normal  information  seeking  behaviour.  Under  this  negative  definition  IA  was  seen,
especially in the past, as unhealthy or abnormal, but while most researchers have shaken
this judgement, it can still be traced until now. Therefore most scholars of IA feel the need
to proclaim their neutral viewpoint towards IA (e.g. Eriksson and Helgesson 2005; Sweeny
et. al. 2010; Manheim 2014; Addison 2017, notably p. 144; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 124;
Woolley  and  Risen  2018;  Howell  et.  al.  2019,  p.  153)  and  other  research  still  sees
sometimes behaviour rooted in avoidance as maladaptive or inferior to approach (Manheim
2014; Addison 2017, notably p. 138-140).
Consequently,  there  are  more  and  more  researchers  which  intend  to  separate  IA from
information seeking.  They argue that  IA can be found independently from information
seeking,  meaning  not  only  that  one  can  appear  without  the  other,  but  that  both  have
sometimes no direct or even a positive relation to each other (Jang 2014; Manheim 2014;
Gaspar et. al. 2016, notably p. 542; McCloud et. al. 2017, p. 358; Song 2017). Therefore it
should also be researched independently (Jang 2014; Manheim 2014; Song 2017).
Manheim (2014) is the most prominent one, having created an entire framework of  (2)
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information  non-seeking-behaviour  (in  short  non-seeking  behaviour),  under  which
avoidance  behaviour  can  be  categorised  separately  from  seeking  behaviour.  Manheim
identified three areas under which behaviour intended to reduce or avoid knowledge-gain
were studied. Namely satisficing, focused upon premature ending of the seeking-process as
well as source selection, information overload, concerned with filtering of information and
when information becomes too much as well  as Information Avoidance itself,  which is
mostly concerned with why and when people avoid a search altogether. While all three
topics are important, this paper focuses solely on IA. However, in recent research, these
areas  have  begun to  intermingle,  as  IA becomes  more  emancipated  from information-
seeking behaviour  and develops  into its  own research-area.  Addison (2017) is  a prime
example, as she defines IA along a scale, which determines how intensive people avoid
information,  thereby completely  disregarding  Manheim's  definition  of  information
overload  (which  originally  encompasses  filtering)  and  IA  (which  is,  according  to
Manheim, mostly focused upon complete avoidance) (Manheim 2014; Addison 2017, p.
126).
The last overarching area is (3) Avoidance literature, most prominent in psychological and
medical  research.  Avoidance  literature  encompasses  many  different  areas  of  affective,
behavioural and cognitive research, which have only in common that something is being
tried to be circumvented,  instead of approached (Wiebe 2013, p. 169). Considering the
wide  scope  of  the  avoidance  literature,  not  all  of  its  possible  manifestations  will  be
mentioned. Notable from an IA viewpoint are however topic avoidance and experiential
avoidance. Both contain at least some findings that can be applied to IA. Topic avoidance
encompasses the avoidance of topics in communication, either to avoid giving answers on
certain topics or to gain answers on others. Hence, topic avoidance has some similar areas
to IA, but it focus on the communication of information, rather than the information itself
(Afifi and Afifi 2009, p. 489f.). Experiential avoidance refers to the avoidance of certain
experiences,  usually  due  to  anxiety  or  fear.  Since  experiences  can  also  be  defined  as
information,  experiential  avoidance  has  many  areas  in  common with  IA (Chawla  and
Ostafin  2007).  Additionally,  experiential  avoidance  is  closely  linked  to  negative
reinforcement, the idea that harmful behaviour is promoted due to its short time benefits
(Boswell et. al. 2013, p. 1f.). A subcategory of experiential avoidance is the avoidance of
trauma, as victims in many cases try to circumvent information that might remind them of
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their  trauma.  Since  such behaviour  is  often aversive to  the  healing process,  there  is  a
substantial amount of literature regarding it (however in this article only Fleurkens et. al.
2014 will be referenced).
IA refers to any behaviour intended to avoid information. There are two points of special
relevance: intention and the assumptions on which information is based upon. Information
in this  context refers to  knowledge that is  at  least  suspected to be relevant,  helpful  or
desirable to the recipient. Intention is the conscious aim to avoid this knowledge instead of
the costs of the acquiring-process, thus always requiring knowledge of the availability of
the information. The behaviour in itself is neutral, as it can be both beneficial as well as
harmful.
IA has been defined in many different  ways.  Sweeny et.  al.  defined IA as  “behaviour
intended  to  prevent  or  delay  the  acquisition  of  available  but  potentially  unwanted
information” (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 341). According to them IA can be active or passive
(based on whenever  effort  is  needed to avoid the information),  temporal  or permanent
(information acquisition might only be delayed), harmful or helpful (making the behaviour
itself  neutral)  and  concerned  with  both  desired  or  undesired  information  (anticipation
might  be  increased  by  avoidance  of  desired  information)  or  information  about  others.
Knowledge dismissal as well as interference avoidance are not IA, since the disregarded
information was consciously explored first. However selective exposure is IA, since the
decision to avoid is based upon assumed, instead of known content (Ibid., p. 341f.).
Manheim (2014) instead sees IA as complete avoidance of an information or the seeking
process for it. However, Manheim does not define IA directly, but rather highlights that
most researchers utilise it this way. The research is grounded in cost-benefit calculations in
which the benefits of having an information are calculated against the threat it presents
(instead  of  the  cost  of  acquisition).  Thus  it  is  still  based  upon  the  assumption  that
knowledge, and such information, possesses inherent value, despite information overload
theory  showing  the  harmful  effects  knowledge can  exhibit.  The  research  is  also  often
concerned with  rational  behaviour,  intending to  unravel  in  which situations  seeking or
avoidance  would  be  superior.  Manheim instead  suggests  to  research  IA in  context  of
Information-non-seeking-behaviour, to find and understand the similarities and differences
between satisficing, information overload and IA.
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Golman et. al. represent the economic research perspective of IA and such their definition
of  it  has  some  notably  differences  from the  aforementioned.  They  believe  that  IA is
common and often rational (Golman et. al. 2017, p. 96-99, 124, 128). Unlike Sweeny et.
al., Golman et. al. assume that IA is also a possible behaviour of animals, even if they limit
their research to that of humans (Ibid.,  p. 96, their assumption is based on Jenkins and
Boakes 1973, who found behavioural patterns in animals, that appear similar to the later
defined IA). Most notably is the fact, that Golman et. al. only focus on “active” IA. For
Golman  et.  al.  active  means  avoidance  behaviour,  in  which  (1)  availability  of  the
information is known and (2) the information is or would be avoided, if it had no cost,
therefore ensuring that the avoidance is solely founded on the (perceived threat of the)
information, rather then the obtaining process (Ibid, p. 97f.). While Sweeny et. al. define
active and passive through the need for action for avoidance (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 341),
Golman et. al. define it through awareness and attention. Consequently Golman et. al.'s
“active” IA is quite similar to Sweeny et. al.'s basic definition of IA. Golman et. al. never
define passive IA or information avoidance behaviour as a whole, but imply that passive IA
would be avoidance due to inattention or subconscious desire, instead of active purpose
(Golman et.  al.  2017, p. 97,  103).  Besides the different definitions of active,  a notable
difference  to  the  former  authors  is  also  the  inclusion  of  mental  avoidance  behaviour.
Golman et. al. see intentional forgetting, misinterpreting or confirmation bias as variations
of IA (Ibid, p. 100-103), while Sweeny et. al. explicitly exclude them, due to them being
“reactions  to  information  that  can  not  be  avoided”,  rather  than  avoidance  of  the
information itself (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 342).
In  her  2017 article,  Addison  explores  IA in  health  care  and  expands  Sweeny  et.  al.'s
definition  to  “any  behaviour  intended  to  prevent  or  delay  the  partial  or  complete
acquisition of available but potentially unwanted information  for reasons including fear
and disinterest” (Addison 2017, p. 127, accentuation added). “Partial or complete” is tied
to Addison's findings that information are often only partial avoided, thus leading her to
interpret IA as a scale, rather than complete avoidance. This is most notably different from
Manheim's definition, in which the investigation of complete avoidance distinguishes IA
research  from  research  on  the  other  kinds  of  non-seeking-behaviour  (Manheim  2014;
Addison 2017,  p.  143f.).  “For  reasons  including fear  and disinterest” is  grounded in
Addison's  findings,  that  situational  effect,  especial  fear,  is  in  most  cases  the  reason to
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engage in IA. Disinterest is often based upon fear and might thus be in many cases the
result  of  a  subconscious  IA decision  according  to  Addison (2017,  p. 126f.).  A notable
difference to  the findings  of  prior  research  is  the low influence  of  traits  on IA (Ibid.,
p. 140f.), being determined mostly by situations rather than personality. This result is not
replicated by Golman et. al.'s article (2017 p. 109), which is however a literature review
instead of a case study, thus accordance with the results of older research is to be expected.
Other newer research also focuses more on situations instead of traits to explain IA, even if
the latter still remains a relevant factor (e.g. Howell et. al. 2014; Jang 2014; Carcioppolo
et. al. 2016, p. 986; Freddi 2017; Vrinten et. al. 2018; Howell et. al. 2019).
In this article IA will be used as in the beginning defined, however it will incorporate other
definitions as necessary, to be as inclusive as possible. While behaviour intended to avoid
information includes disinterest following Addison's results, it will be mostly excluded due
to the difficulties of separating between disinterest caused by fear and disinterest caused by
missing relevance. Since the same reasoning was used by Sweeny et. al. to exclude mental
IA and Golman et. al. to exclude any IA, which is at least partly motivated by the costs of
acquisition, the understanding of disinterest might grow enough to make such an exclusion
obsolete in the future.
As seen by the different definitions and frameworks of IA, as well as prior reviews that are
either partly outdated or based upon a different understanding of IA, information science
requires a new review, if it wants to be thorough. This is the aim of this paper: To provide
an overview about the different trends of research and the current understanding of IA.
Thus the research question follows: How is IA currently understood and researched?
Through this question the paper contributes directly to the information science literature.
However it might also be important for economics, psychology and health related research,
as it aims to connect the different research-path that these areas have taken and make it
possible to view them in one document.
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Theories
There are a number of different theories that were used to explain IA behaviour. Many of
these focus only on aspects of IA or come from different research-areas where IA is not
necessarily directly researched, but rather observed.
One  of  the  most  important  theories  for  IA-research  is  selective  exposure  theory.  It  is
mostly researched in psychology and developed from knowledge dissonance theory: that
people  are  more  likely  to  avoid  knowledge,  if  it  does  not  fit  their  world-view.  Most
notably, this requires that people already know the content or suspect to know the content
of the information they avoid, thus excluding a large part of IA in uncertain circumstances.
Thus it only focuses on one aspect of IA, despite its exhaustive exploration (Sweeny et. al.
2010, p. 341f.). In recent years, selective exposure has come under fundamental critique, as
researchers, most notably Jang and Song, found out that seeking of conformist information
does  not  always  appear  together  with  avoidance  of  non-conformist  information  (e.g.
Sweeny et. al. 2010; Jang 2014; Song 2017; Zhu et. al. 2017 among others). Therefore they
argue to split selective exposure into selective avoidance and selective approach, called
selective seeking by Jang,  as  both  act  independently  from each other.  In  a  contrasting
definition, Zhu et. al. see selective avoidance as complete avoidance of non-conforming
information, similar to Manheim's basic definition of IA (Manheim 2014; Zhu et. al. 2017,
p. 113). This paper will  however use selective avoidance and selective approach in the
sense of Jang or Song. Bode et. al. (2017) researched selective attention, another name for
selective approach, by testing after how many keywords and how much time people stop
reading political posts on social media (Bode et. al. 2017, p. 2f.). While they classify their
research  as  selective  approach,  it  is  also  relevant  for  IA,  since  it  studies  how people
identify information they wish to avoid and thus bears, similarities to satisficing research.
(Bode et. al.  2017, p. 1; for satisficing see Manheim 2014). However unlike satisficing
research,  in  Bode  et.  al.'s  research,  people  stop  not  by  having  a  result,  but  rather  by
noticing that the political content is nothing they wish to deal with right now (Bode et. al.
2017, p. 4). Which could also be classified as coming to a result above the content, rather
than about the information inside the content.
Similar research paths, which are also based upon knowledge dismissal, are confirmation
bias  and  moral  avoidance.  For  ease  of  reading,  both  are  summarised  under  selective
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exposure theory, even though they see themselves as independent strings of research.
According to confirmation bias, also called biased interpretation, people consider what to
believe based upon their former knowledge and thus dismiss information inconsistent with
their  world-view.  This  leads  to  the  result,  that  “presenting  both  sides  with  the  same
evidence increased,  rather than decreased,  belief  polarization” (Golman et.  al.  2017, p.
102). While new information will add to the former knowledge and shift the world-view
slightly  and  indirectly,  it  does  this  far  more  slowly  and  unreliably  than  consistent
information. A subcategory of confirmation bias is optimistic bias, i.e. positive bias. It is
the notion of people that they or people close to them are above the norm in some way.
This above the norm refers to being better than the average, being more resistant to harm
or just more lucky. Optimistic bias is often justified with arguments, however these are
usually based upon personal experiences and rarely robust. Prior research found optimistic
bias to be a reason for less searching, especially in a health context (Addison 2017, p. 14,
140).  Rather  similar  is  optimism management,  which  concludes  that  optimism can  be
managed like any other resource. Therefore IA can be employed to protect such optimism
or optimistic bias (Addison 2017, p. 14; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 110f.).
Moral avoidance, mostly researched in economic literature, classifies itself under strategic
avoidance (Freddi  2017, p.  46;  Golman et.  al.  2017,  p.  116).  But  it  is  also a  form of
selective exposure,  as  people avoid moral  information,  based on its  suspected content.
Moral avoidance is the avoidance of lose-lose-situations, by intentional failing to engage
with  information  about  the  morally  right  decision  (Andreoni  et.  al.  2017,  p.  625-629;
Freddi 2017, p. 3). This is also referred to as “moral wiggle room” in some research (Dana
et. al. 2007, p. 69; cited by Golman et. al. 2017, p. 98f.), based upon the assumption that
people act morally only due to social constraints and appearances, thus this “wiggle room”
is allowing them to act naturally. However Andreoni et. al. argue that people who avoid
moral  information  are  those  which  are  actually  empathic.  By  avoiding  the  moral
information, they can avoid being torn between guilt and the need to preserve their own
resources  (Andreoni  et.  al.  2017,  p.  627).  In  another  discussion  paper  about  moral
avoidance around refugees in Sweden, Freddi found out that people are more likely to
avoid  information  about  the  live  of  refugees,  as  soon  as  these  were  settled  in  close
proximity.  This  relation  was  even  stronger,  if  the  articles  were  empathic  towards  said
refugees. For this study she evaluated clicks on online-newspaper articles. Since these are
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not  openly  viewable,  it  is  unlikely  people  avoided  these  information  to  keep  a  social
appearance, but rather to prevent themselves from feeling guilty (Freddi 2017). Therefore
the results of Freddi's study support Andreoni et. al.'s assumption.
Almost as influential as selective exposure is the Monitoring & Blunting theory. It assumes
that some people prefer information, if they are stressed,  thus possessing the monitoring
trait, and some people avoid additional information under stress, therefore being blunters.
This theory was often employed by older research (see for examples Sweeny et. al. 2010,
p. 347 and Addison 2017, p. 9), even if blunting is a reactive behaviour and thus no IA, at
least  according  to  Howell  et.  al.  (2014,  p. 102f.).  Both  monitoring  and  blunting  are
determined by their respective scales, which are often used to differentiate between light
and strong blunters / monitors (Case et. al. 2005, p. 355; Addison 2017, p. 9, 82). However
until 2005 only the monitoring scale was ever proven to be accurate (Case et. al. 2005,
p. 355). This fits with newer research, which often fails to find proof of monitoring or
blunting influence in an IA context (Addison 2017, p. 131f., 141). While personality traits
seem to  influence  the  information  avoidance  behaviour  (Golman  et.  al.  2017,  p. 109),
Addison assumes them to be more akin to health motivation and perception, instead of
blunting or monitoring behaviour (Addison 2017, p. 85).
Further theories from psychology exploring trait-based avoidance of information include
need for cognition and need for closure. Neither has been well-researched in IA literature,
since their researchers don't count themselves as part of the IA-research body, even if they
study similar topics.
Need for cognition (NFC) refers to the extend, to which people consider cognitive effort as
costly or see intrinsic value in it (Sandra and Otto 2018, p. 102). As such, people low in
NFC should be unwilling to engage in cognitive effort, seeing it in itself as costly, while
people high in NFC should relish in it.  Addison however found no correlation between
NFC and IA,  as  people  would  engage in  seeking  or  information  avoidance  behaviour
independent from their NFC-scores (Addison 2017, p. 79f.). There is no other research on
NFC in the IA literature, but as aforementioned the NFC literature itself often explores
similar topics.
The need for closure (NFC) or need for cognitive closure (NFCC) theory (Brizi 2016, p. 1)
was  only  mentioned  by  Sweeny  et.  al.  as  a  potential  explanation  for  IA and  never
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researched in an IA context (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 347). As need for cognition is already
abbreviated with NFC, in this paper NFCC is used as abbreviation for need for closure,
against research convention. According to the NFCC theory people feel increasing stress
and agitation until a task is finished. This agitation can lead people to initiate the search
process, but will also entice them to accept fast solutions, enabling satisficing behaviour
(according to the definition by Manheim 2014). Then after a task is “closed”, the agitation
entice them to “freeze” it,  meaning they are unwilling to revisit  and question it  again.
Based on this behaviour NFCC can further be divided into urgency NFCC, the need to
close tasks, and permanence NFCC, the need to keep closed tasks closed (Roets et.  al.
2015, p. 225f.; Brizi 2016, p. 1f.). Interestingly, while permanence NFCC measures the
unwillingness to question consolidated beliefs, during the seeking process (urgency NFCC)
people with high NFCC are still  willing to change their assumptions, even through the
input of others (Roets et. al. 2015, p. 229). Only after they have a task completed, do they
avoid contradicting information (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 347; Roets et. al. 2015, p. 229,
232f.). How much a specific person displays NFCC is measured by the NFCC scale, whose
point measurements rank the person between avoidance of closure and need for closure
(Brizi 2016, p. 1f.). While NFCC is usually understood as a stable trait,  it  can also be
influenced through situation specific stimuli, similar to other IA behaviour (Acar-Burkay
et. al. 2014, p. 732; Roets et. al. 2015, p. 223f.; Brizi 2016, p. 2). Some literature assumes
NFCC to be a reversion of need for cognition. However this is not the case, as high NFCC
is not synonymous with avoidance of cognition. As seen with immediate NFCC, people
with  high  need  for  closure  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  information  searching  and
cognition. Only once they have finished a task are they unwilling to revisit it (Roets et. al.
2015, p. 231-233).
Group-centrism theory is based upon high NFCC behaviour. According to group-centrism,
people with high NFCC are more likely to accept a group consensus or actively work to
reach one. They are more likely to defend their group's beliefs against questioners from
within or outside the group and promote their beliefs (Kruglanski et. al. 2006; Roets et. al.
2015, p. 227f.; Brizi 2016, p. 2). As mentioned by immediate NFCC, to reach a consensus
they are willing to be persuaded by other people (Kruglanski et. al. 2006, p. 87; Roets et.
al. 2015, p. 229). To which group people with NFCC belong is obviously context-sensitive,
but Kosic et. al. published an interesting study on it. They found that people high in NFCC
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that came in a group were more resistant against assimilation into a new culture than their
low NFCC counterparts. However people with high NFCC and without a group adopted
the new culture faster (Kosic et. al. 2004, notably p. 809).
There are many theories  regarding information behaviour,  including IA, that  are  based
upon the management of uncertainty. The basic Uncertainty Management Theory (UMT)
defines uncertainty as a state of mind, defined by lack of confidence and knowledge about
a topic (Addison 2017, p. 13). Uncertainty might be either negative, related to anxiety and
fear,  or positive,  defined by hope (Carcioppolo et.  al.  2016, p.  980).  Thus information
behaviour can be either directed to increase uncertainty, to reduce it or to keep it steady.
Most studies assume that negative uncertainty usually leads to seeking behaviour, aimed to
reduce uncertainty, while positive uncertainty would lead to avoidance behaviour, intended
on preserving it (Addison 2017, p. 13). However this is not always the case (Case et. al.
2005, p. 355f.; Carcioppolo et. al. 2016, p. 980f.). Carcioppolo et. al. have defined four
reasons for information behaviour based in uncertainty. These are (1) seeking to reduce
uncertainty,  (2)  seeking  to  increase  uncertainty,  (3)  avoiding  to  maintain  (positive)
uncertainty and (4) avoidance of information perceived as insufficient (Carcioppolo et. al.
2016, p. 979). In accordance with their assumptions, Carcioppolo et. al. did find not only a
relation between the two seeking behaviours and the two avoidance behaviours, but also a
positive  correlation  between  avoidance  to  maintain  (positive)  uncertainty  and  seeking
aimed  to  increase  it  (Ibid.,  p.  985f.).  One  situation  not  specifically  mentioned  by
Carcioppolo et. al. is avoidance behaviour to maintain (un-) certainty, by avoiding further
conflicting information. (3) is assumed to preserve positive uncertainty (Ibid., p. 980), but
it might just as well be used to prevent negative uncertainty from increasing. Inhibitory
Intolerance of Uncertainty, a trait from clinical psychology which is explained in detail
later, manifests as avoidance of actions in uncertain situations. This specific form of IA is
used to manage uncertainty,  by preventing current negative uncertainty from increasing
(Talkovsky and Norton 2016, p. 108). Additionally, “insufficient” in (4) refers to rejection
of information perceived as irrelevant or misleading (Carcioppolo et.  al.  2016, p. 981).
Considering  that  information  might  also  be  rejected  based  on  confirmation  bias  and
selective exposure theory, “insufficient” implies an impartiality that is not always the case.
Lastly, while not bound to positive or negative uncertainty, Carcioppolo et. al.'s model ties
changes of uncertainty to  seeking behaviour,  while  preservation is  always achieved by
17
avoidance  (Ibid,  p.  979).  This  implies  that  a  change  in  certainty  can  only  come  by
receiving  new  information  and  not  by  reconsidering  already  acquired  knowledge.
Considering the human ability to worry and to come to conclusions on their  own, this
appears to be a dangerous baseline assumption.
In 2004, Afifi and Weiner developed the Theory of Motivated Information Management
(TMIM) based on UMT and in 2009 Afifi and Afifi revisited it. The theory was developed
for topic avoidance (Afifi and Afifi 2009, p. 489), thus being focused solely upon direct
communication. However, its conception is broad enough to merit its consideration also in
other instances of information behaviour. In TMIM the information behaviour process is
initiated  by  a  discrepancy  between  actual  uncertainty  and  intended  uncertainty.  The
intended uncertainty  can  be  either  more  or  less  uncertainty.  This  discrepancy  leads  to
anxiety, which in turn initiates the information management process. Since anxiety starts
the  management  process,  the  process  will  end  if  the  anxiety  is  resolved,  even  if  the
discrepancy between actual uncertainty and intended uncertainty is  not.  The evaluation
phase follows after this initiation phase, in which the possible gains are weighted against
the risks.  Lastly  follows the decision phase,  in  which the person decides to  engage in
communication or to avoid the topic. Main problem of the TMIM according to its creator
are their evaluation factors, of which only communication self-efficacy is reliable (Ibid.,
p. 491-493).  Especially  the unreliable  results  of coping efficacy are for Afifi  and Afifi
surprising,  considering  how  important  it  should  be  to  be  able  to  deal  with  the  new
information. They assume that the problem could be the measurement, which might only
measure personal coping ability instead of relational coping ability, meaning the ability of
the  relation  between the  subjects  to  withstand the  information  (Ibid.,  p. 505f.).  Unlike
UMT, TMIM does not differentiate between positive and negative uncertainty. However, it
does include the wish to increase uncertainty, which usually would mean desired positive
uncertainty, being in most cases hope. Interestingly, this intend to increase hope is still tied
to the anxiety of having too little hope, instead of it being pursued as self-gain. Unlike
basic UMT, TMIM predicts the preservation of negative uncertainty as well (e.g. every
time someone engages in IA, despite anxiety to do otherwise). Lastly it does not include IA
to retain actual positive uncertainty. After all, the model is initiated by desired change in
uncertainty, thus excluding any behaviour intended to preserve uncertainty as self-gain,
instead of preservation of uncertainty for fear of the suspected consequences. This shows
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the main limitation of the TMIM: That it only predicts active and not reactive information
behaviour.  Reactive information behaviour  would have to be measured by a  difference
between current and expected uncertainty instead (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 342 criticised
UMT in general in a similar way. However Carcioppolo et. al. included reactive behaviour
in UMT by protection of uncertainty through avoidance, while TMIM did not).
Uncertainty Orientation is a trait that is measured by a scale of point values, ranging from
certainty-orientated  to  uncertainty-orientated.  Uncertainty-oriented  people  prefer  new
information and thus more uncertainty, while certainty-oriented people prefer to avoid new
information, thereby reducing the amount of uncertainty they have to face. Uncertainty
Orientation was solely mentioned by Sweeny et. al. as a likely reason for IA (Sweeny et. al.
2010, p. 347). It is also the foundation of the NFCC theory (Acar-Burkay et. al. 2014, p.
720).  While  not  rebuked,  Uncertainty  Orientation  has  simply  not  seen  use  in  the  IA
literature since Sweeny et. al.
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) is a clinical classification applied in psychology. People
with IU have a negative view of uncertainty and react with a great deal of negative anxiety
in  uncertain  situations,  often  expressed  in  excessive  worry.  IU  was  firstly  linked  to
generalised anxiety disorder, however newer research argues that IU is common in many
different emotional disorders, but may manifest in different behavioural patterns (Boswell
et. al. 2013, notably p. 1f.). It can be separated into the trait IU, as well as disorder- or
situation-specific IU, which could be an intermediary between trait IU and the symptoms it
causes  (Shihata  et.  al.  2016,  p. 116).  “Worry  [and  so  IU]  can  serve  an  experiential
avoidance function”, as non-arrival of dreaded events is attributed to worry instead of their
low probability, thus leading to negative reinforcement (Boswell et. al. 2013, p. 1f.). There
are two kinds of IU, namely prospective IU and inhibitory IU (Shihata et. al. 2016, p. 116;
Talkovsky and Norton 2016, p. 108). While prospective IU is classified by “active[ly] […]
seeking  certainty”  and  a  general  “desire  for  predictability”,  inhibitory  IU  leads  to
avoidance of actions or paralysis until either higher certainty is reached or the uncertain
situation  has  passed  (Talkovsky  and  Norton  2016,  p.  108).  Thus  prospective  IU  is  a
response based on future uncertainty,  while  inhibitory IU reacts on present  uncertainty
(Shihata et. al. 2016, p. 116). Sweeny et. al. assume that people high in IU would be more
likely  to  search  for  information  to  reduce  their  uncertainty  (an  assumption  that  was
confirmed  by  one  study  referenced  by  Sweeny  et.  al.  2010,  p. 347).  However,  this
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assumption seems only to hold true for prospective IU. Inhibitory IU should be more likely
to engage in IA, until the uncertain situation has become more manageable (Shihata et. al.
2016,  p. 116),  similar  to  certainty-orientated  people  in  Uncertainty  Orientation  Theory
(Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 347). This would also fit with Carcioppolo et. al.'s results, that
seeking can either increase or decrease uncertainty (Carcioppolo et. al. 2016, p. 985. For
additional examples see Case et. al. 2005, p. 355f.).
Utility theory is one of the most important explanations for IA in economics. Most other
theories employed there, for example moral or strategic IA, can be traced back to utility
theory. According to utility theory people consider different objects to have different utility
and  choose  between  them  based  upon  their  utility  in  conjugation  with  the  cost  of
acquisition. While the basal utility theory was based upon material gains, more modern
forms  of  the  theory  also  include  strategical  utility,  which  only  “promote[s]  material
outcomes” (Golman et. al. 2017, p. 129). Thus IA can also be classified by utility theory, as
the  avoidance  of  information  can  be  used  to  manipulate  the  behaviour  of  others  and
oneself.  Golman et.  al.  wish to extend this definition of utility further.  Following their
argumentation, pleasure and well-being are also forms of immaterial utility, which carry no
direct benefits  and are thus not strategical.  Golman et.  al.  refer to this  second form of
utility as hedonic and the verification of its influence on IA is one of the aims of their
article (Ibid., p. 19, 128f.).
IA to gain strategical utility is fittingly dubbed strategical IA and is an important part of
game theory, but also found in other research areas. In its simplest form strategic IA refers
to the old saying: „Ignorance is Innocence“, meaning that missing knowledge, even if self-
inflicted,  protects  from  conviction.  Golman  et.  al.  encompass  under  strategic  IA any
behaviour,  which  intends  to  manipulate  the  behaviour  of  oneself,  named  intrapersonal
strategic IA, or others, interpersonal strategic IA, through the avoidance of information.
There are many experimental studies on strategic IA. Notably, Huck et. al. discovered that
the knowledge of a high wage for a task leads to less (work) motivation and efficacy, than
being uncertain about ones wage (Huck et. al. 2015. Golman et. al. 2017, p. 115 wrongly
cite  that  being  uncertain  was  merely  as  efficient  as  being  promised  the  high  wages).
Additionally while much research assumes that IA would be stronger after a decision (see
Golman et. al. 2017, p. 110-113), there is also some research that suggests that IA is in
certain cases stronger before a decision, to avoid temptation or doubt. After the decision
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has passed, these people displayed less IA (Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 241f.  While this
correlation was found also elsewhere [Golman et.  al.  2017, p. 114; Woolley and Risen
2018, p. 230f.],  Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 239, 241 give their control-group for after
decision-IA no decision, assuming that those results would be identical. Thus their findings
are less dependable, than they assume). Moral avoidance, in this paper classified under
selective exposure, is a form of strategic IA as well,  since people choose to not obtain
information, that would otherwise lead either to undesired feelings or behaviour (Golman
et. al. 2017, p. 117f.).
Hedonic IA refers to IA, that is utilised to increase, gain or avoid decrease of pleasure
(Golman et. al. 2017, p. 105). There is less research based upon it, as Golman et. al. still
attempt to establish it (Ibid., p. 128f.). Noteworthy are Ganguly and Tasoff who found that
some people would forgo payment to avoid getting tested for a disease, even if it would
requires  no  additional  effort  (Ganguly  and  Tasoff  2017,  p.  4037f.).  However  moral
avoidance could also be classified under hedonic IA, as ultimately the avoidance of guilt, a
form of negative affect that would decrease pleasure, is the intention of the behaviour.
Similar cases can be made for many forms of IA, most notably positive bias.
Possibly a manifestation of positive bias (Golman et. al.  2017, p. 111), groupthink is a
behavioural  model  researched in  psychology and economics  (Bénabou 2013, p.  2;  e.g.
Golman et. al. 2017), in which the belief of a group is supported and advocated, despite
overwhelming  counter  arguments.  Groupthink  describes  a  situation,  in  which  people
support “the” belief of their group and act according to it. They defend this belief against
opposing information and other threats  from within and outside,  even despite towering
evidence (Kruglanski et. al. 2006, p. 88, 95; Bénabou 2013; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 111). It
is thus quite similar to the younger group-centrism theory of NFCC. But while groupthink
believes that the need of the group is ranked falsely above the social reality, group-centrism
defines the group itself as the social reality of its members (Kruglanski et. al. 2006, p. 88).
Thus leading to the main difference of the theories, that according to group-centrism the
social reality creates the group-belief, while in groupthink this belief is defended against
the social reality. If the definition of social reality would be unified, these theories could be
possible combined.
Similar to optimistic bias is also competency theory. Known as well as Dunning-Kruger
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effect  and  fittingly  dubbed  as  meta-ignorance  by  Dunning  (2011),  competency  theory
states that people who have no or low knowledge in an area, often also fail to realise that
they need information about it. Thus they have a false sense of competence, leading to bad
decisions and the avoidance of needed information (Dunning 2011, p. 260;Addison 2017,
p.  139f.).  Interestingly,  Dunning  found  that  actual  knowledgeable  people  project  their
competence on others, thus assuming that those others are more competent, than they are
(Dunning 2011, p. 271f.). Competency theory is a difficult topic for IA, as the subjects are
not aware that they are missing information and thus do not want them. While relevant
information is avoided, the subjects do not recognise it as relevant, which makes it not IA
from their perspective. Even more interesting is the theory in consideration of confirmation
bias. Since the information is only non-relevant in the subjects world-view, it could be
classified as confirmation bias. Finally, the distinction between avoiding information due
to believing them to be unnecessary (or wrong) and avoiding them due to the fear of being
wrong, is very important.  Based upon this distinction,  which isn't made in competency
theory itself, it is either simple ignorance or IA, with the subject trying to protect their own
ignorance. Competency theory was often criticised for being based on over reported results
due to reliance on redundant measurements (Feld et. al. 2017, p. 19f.). Modern research
found  the  effect  to  be  existent,  but  being  less  influential  than  Dunning  and  Kruger
originally imagined (Ibid., p. 23). While not researching competency theory directly in an
IA context, Addison mentioned the theory as a possible explanation for peoples'  wrong
assumptions about their seeking behaviour. She concluded, that competency theory extends
into information literacy, thus leading people to assume that they would search longer and
more efficient, than they do in reality (Addison 2017, p. 141f.).
Lastly, Witte's extended parallel process model (EPPM) and crisis decision theory are two
different  theories  in  psychology with the same conceptualisation of resource allocation
(Vrinten et. al. 2018, p. 118). Because of these similarities they are not differentiated here.
If people are faced with a threat after EPPM, they consider their resources and possible
strategies for dealing with it. However, if no sufficient strategy is available the effort is
instead allocated to avoiding the cognitive consideration of the threat. According to EPPM,
this allocation is based upon fear motivation,  while in crisis decision theory,  IA is not
considered an avoidance of the coping process, but rather a viable strategy of it (Howell et.
al.  2014, p. 102; Vrinten et.  al.  2018, p. 118). EPPM possesses many similarities with
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TMIM, as both are based upon emotional motivators, fear or anxiety,  which determine
resource allocation. However TMIM is based upon in itself neutral uncertainty instead of
negative threat and resources are allocated to resolve the anxiety, instead of the uncertainty.
Thus  it  gives  an  explanation  why  sometimes  the  uncertainty  management  process  is
finished, without having reached a level of desired uncertainty (Afifi and Afifi 2009, p.
491). Both EPPM and crisis decision theory were rarely used in IA or IA-related research,
even if they did predict IA behaviour in those rare instances adequately (e.g. Howell et. al.
2014; Vrinten et. al. 2018).
All these theories predict in some way IA. However some, notably IU and NFCC, were
never explored in IA research itself, while others, Monitoring & Blunting and Uncertainty
Orientation, were used less with time. In recent years theories based upon behaviour or
knowledge have been found to be more reliable, while theories based upon traits are seeing
more and more criticism. The explored theories are not exhaustive however. For example
Avoidance Motivation could provide a framework to explore IA, even if researchers would
have to rework it to include modern results.
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Research-methods
IA has been researched using many different methods, due to the difficulties of measuring
IA. Most commonly employed were surveys, in physical form or online. The latter were
mostly conducted using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online labour
market, in which people complete studies for a small amount of monetary compensation.
Surprisingly  fewer  workers  on  MTurk  were  interested  in  their  payment  (45%),  than
students paid with college credits (78%) in a study conducted 2011. Other, but less relevant
reasons  for  participation  were  the  entertainment  factor  or  the  acquiring  of  new skills
(Chandler and Shapiro 2016, p. 59f.).
While listed here among surveys, online experiments can also be conducted on MTurk.
Most  notably,  in  one  study  the  participants  webcams  were  used  for  an  eye-tracking
experiment  (Ibid.,  p. 63).  Tasks  on  MTurk  are  often  completed  under  distracting
circumstances, but no relevant negative influence on data quality has been found (Ibid.,
p. 60). To prevent hasty or wrong answers most researchers employ at least some trick
questions,  which  have  a  specific  answer  demanded  in  their  question-text  or  are
intentionally  complex  (e.g.  Addison  2017,  p. 40f.,  146;  Howell  et.  al.  2016,  p. 818f.).
Though  Chandler  and  Shapiro  discourage  from  employing  such  tricks,  as  they  might
influence answers on following questions and MTurk-workers have become increasingly
adapt  at  spotting them. Instead  data  quality  should be ensured through “less  obtrusive
approaches”, like selecting participants by approval rating (Chandler and Shapiro 2016,
p. 70).
Overall Chandler and Shapiro recommend keeping as much information as possible hidden
about the purpose of a study, to prevent selection bias, i.e. study-selection based on the
content of the study, as well as wrong reporting, due to misunderstandings or intent. The
later is incentivised by the monetary nature of the platform, as misleading self-reports open
access to studies and therefore payment. Thus research should not be limited to specific
populations,  but  rather  measure  their  presence  within  the  participants.  If  exclusion  is
necessary based on the rarity of a group, questionnaires or tasks inside the study should be
employed to identify pretenders. For example one study let military veterans sort insignia
by rank. Another problem of MTurk are practice effects, i.e. the familiarity that workers
gain  with  common  research  measurements.  Most  notably  they  do  improve  their
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performance on measurable ability  checks,  like IQ-Tests.  Chandler  and Shapiro advice
communication  between  related  research  to  exclude  workers  from participating  in  too
similar studies, potentially by using external software or linking data to worker-identifiers
(Ibid., p. 67-70).
Nevertheless most research on MTurk came to positive results considering its reliability
(Howell et. al. 2016, p. 818; e.g. Chandler and Shapiro 2016, notably p. 72f.), even though
its workforce has some notable differences to the population as a whole. So are MTurk-
workers mostly younger, more liberal and less religious. They are also usually less capable
in dealing with stressful or social situations, including having a higher proportion of related
mental conditions. Chandler and Shapiro therefore conclude, that MTurk might be useful
to reach populations, which are usual under-represented in conventional studies (Chandler
and Shapiro 2016, p. 57-59, 73).
However MTurk is not the only labour market in existence (Ibid., p. 72f.), despite being
the only one used in the reviewed studies. Furthermore Addison utilized MTurk merely to
recruit participants and conducted her actual study on LimeSurvey, a Canadian survey-
platform (Addison 2017, p. 33). Besides that, Vrinten et. al. employed survey data from the
Attitudes, Behaviour, and Cancer-UK Survey (ABACUS) 2014 and Song reused interview-
data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2012 (Song 2017, p. 52; Vrinten
et. al. 2018, p. 119).
Hypothetical scenarios were used in many surveys, most often in the health domain. They
refer to scenarios in which people are supposed to imagine being in a certain situation, in
most cases having contracted a threatening disease (Dawson et. al. 2006; Howell et. al.
2016;  Addison  2017;  Ganguly  and  Tasoff  2017,  p. 4052-4057).  While  hypothetical
scenarios are  not  necessarily reflective of peoples real behaviour  and often biased,  the
advantages are the easy modifiability and that they allow ethical observation of people in
problematic  situation.  Additional  the  created  psychological  distance  prevents  observer
effects. However Addison forgoes the use of words like 'imagine', so that participants do
not  feel  too removed from the study (Addison 2017,  p. 36;  Ganguly and Tasoff  2017,
p. 4052). Such online surveys were sometimes employed as pretest to prepare interviews,
user studies or experiments (Addison 2017, p. 32; Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 233f.).
Experiments were conducted nearly as often, with a wide range of different tasks, probably
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because of the many different research areas. Notable is Jang, who used cognitive load, to
simulate multi-tasking and thus proved that selective exposure requires cognitive effort
(Jang 2014, p. 679-681). He also employed tracking software, to study which links people
followed, in separating selective approach and selective exposure. For each of his three
topics he provided a pro, contra and neutral link and studied which of these links people
followed (Ibid., p. 673). Similar tracking was employed by Gaspar et. al. to measure if a
glossary, reachable by clicking highlighted terms in their study text, saw use. For this they
used the online deliberation tool VIZZATA, which comes with these possibilities included
(Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 539).
There were also different tasks to capture implicit IA, i.e. avoidance that is not controlled
by cognition. Howell et. al. used speed, forcing people to select an answer for a scale under
time pressure, while Woolley and Risen designed decisions, where people had to decide if
they would accept an emotional unappealing offer (Howell et. al. 2016, p. 817f.; Woolley
and Risen 2018, p. 232f.). Lastly there was an Approach-Avoidance Task, employed by
Fleurkens  et.  al.,  in  which  people  had  to  either  push  away  or  drag  to  them different
pictures. If these pictures were to be pushed or dragged was determined by their frame, so
that Fleurkens et. al. could measure by the differences in speed and distance the implicit IA
tendency toward the pictures themselves (Fleurkens et. al. 2014, p. 2f.).
Nash-Games  and  other  bargaining  games  were  used  by  economic  research  to  prove
strategic IA. In these games IA provided a significant, even if not obvious, advantage. By
learning  to  utilize  this  advantage,  people  demonstrated  the  existence  of  strategic  IA
(Golman  et.  al.  2017,  p. 120). Similar  experiments  were  employed  to  measure  moral
avoidance.  In an experiment  'dictators'  could choose one of two outcomes,  while  their
partners just had to accept it. Both partner and 'dictator' would always prefer one outcome,
however which one the partner preferred was hidden. If it was possible for the 'dictator' to
learn which outcome their partner would prefer,  they would still  more often avoid that
information.  This  was however  only true in  those cases,  where their  partner  would be
informed about the decision to learn the information. Since the 'dictator' could choose the
outcome of the game and the game partner just needed to accept it, by openly avoiding the
information, the game partner would be more likely to accept the deal (Ibid.,  p. 116f.).
Other variations of moral avoidance experiments include Andreoni et. al. They instructed
Salvation Army members to either ask or silently implore for donations in front of one or
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two supermarket entrances.  By comparing the amount of donations and the number of
contributors between the different settings, they found that some people would avoid by
using  another  exit,  while  others  would  try  to  ignore  the  Salvation  Army  members
(Andreoni et. al. 2017). Finally Freddi researched moral avoidance by identifying through
a text-analysis topics people would be likely to avoid and then measured the number of
page-views (clicks) to study the avoidance of these topics (Freddi 2017, p. 12-14). Even if
not directly IA, Bode et. al. used eye trackers to measure selective attention, by counting
after how many words people would stop to read an article (Bode et. al. 2017, p. 2f.). For
topic avoidance Afifi and Afifi invited pairs of parents and their children to their study.
These pairs got, after filling out a short survey, to sit together and choose three of four
topics, which they could discuss as long as they would like. By measuring how long each
pair discussed a topic and which topic was eliminated, both in combination with the results
from the  survey,  Afifi  and  Afifi  tried  to  deduce  which  traits  would  be  related  to  the
avoidance of which topics. They however note, that their study promotion might have lead
to selection bias, i.e. preselection, among their participants. So did they promote their study
as one about parent-child relationships. This might have primarily attracted pairs to the
study, which already had or believed to have a good relationship to begin with (Afifi and
Afifi  2009).  Finally  Howell  et.  al.  (2019)  measured  threat  by  taking  pictures  of  their
participants and pretending that these would be rated by different groups. They found that
participants were most likely to avoid their  ratings, if  they were to be rated by fellow
students  from  their  own  university.  If  they  were  to  be  rated  by  students  at  others
universities, especially on other continents, or by children or retirees, were they far less
likely to avoid their feedback.
Interviews  were  also  sometimes  used.  Most  notably  by  Addison,  who used  MTurk as
pretest  and quantitative  survey,  as  a  contrast  to  the  qualitative  interviews,  which  were
combined with a user study (Addison 2017, p. 31-33). Interviews have the advantage that
they can be exhaustive and that behaviour the researcher was previously not aware of can
also  be  identified.  Chatman  found  prove  of  IA  by  elderly  women  in  a  retirement
community. This is notably since in Chatman's time IA was neither known nor defined.
Thus she described the behaviour of IA and highlighted the need for further research on the
topic,  without  employing the term IA itself.  Chatman conducted her  interviews over  a
longer time frame, to gain the trust of the elderly and to be exhaustive (Chatman 1992).
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However time can also be employed to measure changes. This was done by Gaspar et. al.
with three surveys, to test how much a IA desire would affect the (perceived) knowledge
about and attitude towards red meat over time (Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 539). Likewise did
Geiß, who spread three telephone-surveys over as many weeks to measure differences in
mass media reception. However due to practical limitations these telephone surveys were
restricted to the city of Mainz, an urban area with an above average education level. Thus
they were on their own not representative of whole Germany, as Geiß mentions in his
section  on  limitations  (Geiß  2015,  p.  18,  313f.).  Gaspar  et.  al.  surveyed  the  same
participants in their studies, with few people leaving before the third survey. In contrast
Geiß added people for the second and third wave, to control for panel-effects, meaning
influences through the telephone survey itself (Geiß 2015, p. 313f.; Gaspar et. al. 2016, p.
538f.).
Lastly there were in some rare cases statistics employed to determine likely IA behaviour,
e.g. in research on groupthink (Bénabou et. al. 2013).
There are many different measurements to gauge IA and factors that might be related to it.
Most  commonly  employed  were  scales,  intended  to  either  gain  knowledge  about  a
participants personality or to measure IA (e.g. in Afifi and Afifi 2009, p. 495-498; Acar-
Burkay et. al. 2014; Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 539-541; Addison 2017, p. 61-63; Vrinten et. al.
2018, p. 119f.). However if combined with experiments, the avoidance in the experiment
itself was often measured (e.g. in Jang 2014; Bode et. al. 2017; Freddi 2017; Ganguly and
Tasoff 2017; Howell et. al. 2019). Therefore, different researchers made use of illnesses
and risk-calculators to measure health IA. The use of fake illnesses had the advantage, that
they were easier to manipulate than real diseases to measure the influence of different
factors on IA. These factors were mainly relevance and controllability, measured in how
serious an illness was and if it could be treated (Dawson et. al. 2006, p. 752f.). However
real diseases could be manipulated by choosing different phrasings (Dawson et. al. 2006, p.
752; Addison 2017, p. 37f.) or strains of the same disease  (Ganguly and Tasoff 2017, p.
4043f.).
To avoid confusing IA with disinterest, Howell et. al. employed button prompts, in which
the  information  gain  was  preselected.  Thus  people  had  to  actively  choose  avoidance
(Howell  et.  al.  2016,  p.  817).  Similar  did  Ganguly  and  Tasoff  take  a  blood  probe
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irrespective if their participants had chosen to undergo testing. The blood samples of those
which avoided the confidential test were discarded afterwards. By this it should be insured
that the test was avoided for fear of the information, instead of the testing procedure or
social stigma (Ganguly and Tasoff 2017, p. 4043f.).
In conclusion was IA researched with many different methods. Most commonly employed
were surveys, in physical form or online, followed by experiments in many different forms
ranging  from  approach-avoidance-tasks  to  Nash  Bargaining  games.  Additionally  the
completion  of  tasks  under  distractions  or  time  pressure  was  employed  to  measure
situational  or implicit  avoidance.  Interviews were also sometimes used,  in  one case in
combination with a quantitative study on MTurk. While interviews and surveys are simple
to conduct, they are also the most vulnerable to wrong reporting, either through wrong
memories or because IA is seen as inferior and less desirable to be reported (Addison 2017,
p. 139; Moodley et. al. 2018, p. 10). While experiments require more effort to prepare and
are often more limited in their application, they give concrete proof of certain behaviour,
especially  if  people  are  not  aware  of  what  is  tested  (e.g.  Ganguly  and  Tasoff  2017,
p. 4048).  Additional  have  distractions,  time  pressure  and  other  influencers  shown
themselves promising in researching certain aspects of IA, even though they have been
only rarely employed (e.g. Jang 2014; Howell et. al. 2016; Woolley and Risen 2018). All in
all each of these methods posses their own advantages, which should be considered for
future research.
29
Reasons for Information Avoidance
As  different  researchers  have  used  different  frameworks,  theories  and  methods  to
understand and explain IA, so they also came to different conclusions which reasons lead
someone to engage in it. These reasons partially overlap, making it impossible to create a
single list about the triggers which might lead to IA.
Sweeny et.  al.  separated the  reasons of  IA into three categories,  namely  IA to protect
cherished believes, avoid actions or change, and to preserve emotions. Based on selective
exposure Sweeny et. al. state that people are unwilling to change their believes, making
consistency with prior assumptions an important predictor of IA. Their second assumption
is, that such beliefs are usually self-enhancing and thus cherished (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p.
342f.). Hence people would engage in IA, “to the extend [that they] […] anticipate that
information might challenge either the positivity or consistency” (Ibid., p. 343) of their
beliefs. Self-enhancing refers not to necessarily positive beliefs, as negative stereotypes
about others might also be viewed as self-enhancing or be cherished. Similarly, stereotypes
can be questioned by default, if someone holds a stereotype questioning belief. However
self-enhancing is not always influential, as Sweeny et. al. note in regard to world-view.
Here they find only consistency as a relevant factor. IA might also be employed, to avoid
the need for action or change.  By avoiding the information that might  demand action,
people avoid also the need to make the possible difficult decision if they would act upon
this information. Lastly IA can be employed to preserve emotions, either by prolonging
pleasant ones or by avoiding negative ones. For example anticipation or happiness could be
prolonged, while fear or regret would be avoided. Especially with regards to regret  do
Sweeny et. al. distinguish between negative emotions based directly upon an information
or  negative  emotion  based  upon  a  decision.  Only  the  former  would  fall  under  IA to
preserve emotions. While not all three reasons have to appear in any situation in which
people engage in IA, Sweeny et. al. believe that emotions always are involved. Finally,
these reasons are not the sole factor in determining IA behaviour, as personality, coping
resources and situational affect decide if someone engages in IA, if he has reason to do so.
(Ibid., p. 342-344).
Golman et. al. instead see IA as the reaction to either hedonic, value measured in well-
being, or strategical considerations. Hedonic reasons are for Golman et. al. all reasons, in
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which the use of the avoidance lies in its emotional satisfaction or protection, instead of
measurable values (Golman et. al. 2017, p. 105, 128f.). Strategical considerations overlap
with  strategic  avoidance  theory  and  can  be  classified  into  intrapersonal  reasons,  i.e.
avoidance to manipulate ones own behaviour, and interpersonal reasons, i.e. avoidance to
influence  the  behaviour  of  others  (Ibid.,  p. 113,  119).  Neither  of  these  reasons  for
avoidance is superior to the other or flat out negative. Golman et. al. conclude that hedonic
values are just as important as strategical ones and far too rarely considered in economic
literature (Ibid., p. 100, 128f.). In contrast they also give many morally faultless examples
for  both  kinds  of  strategical  avoidance  (so  intrapersonal  strategical  IA includes  the
avoidance of temptation and interpersonal strategical IA the open avoidance of knowledge
to weaken ones own bargaining position in order to promote a deal.) (Ibid., p. 114, 120f.).
While Golman et. al. affirm that people also avoid knowledge despite its greater benefits,
their assumptions are mostly based upon clear, intentional avoidance. This is partly due to
their definition of active IA, to which they limit their research (Ibid., p. 97), but it is an
important difference to other research. Coping resources and situational affect, as explored
in the next chapter, are seen as main predictors if a possible occasion for IA actually leads
to IA. Since Golman et.  al.'s  research is  founded in utility theory,  they consider IA as
allocation,  or  non-allocation,  of  available  resources  including  coping  resources  (Ibid.,
p. 100).  While  this  also  leads  to  less  pronunciation  of  situational  affect  than  in  other
literature, this excludes the difference between IA based upon direct decision or missing
coping resources.  This  difference  is  especially  important  in  health  care research,  since
people often avoid information that should be beneficial to them due to low coping abilities
(e.g. in Howell et. al. 2014, p. 108; Savolainen 2014, p. 64; Vrinten et. al. 2018, p. 118f.).
Following Golman et. al. such behaviour would be a neutral, or even useful allocation of
resources, while in health care this is seen as behaviour in need of treatment (Howell et. al.
2014, p. 108; Vrinten et. al. 2018, p. 118f.). While this might be a monument from times
where IA was seen as inferior to information seeking (Manheim 2014), the large body of
research based upon this distinction should not be excluded.
Combining Sweeny et. al. and Golman et. al. is difficult, as protection of beliefs can be
either hedonic or strategic forms of IA, based upon the circumstances. So a belief might be
protected under the conception of ignorance is innocence, a strategical consideration, but
also because reconsidering it is emotionally taxing, a hedonic consideration. The other two
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reasons of Sweeny et. al. are simpler, as avoidance of action or change falls under strategic
IA and preservation of emotions is hedonic, since it  has no direct measurable benefits.
Unlike Golman et. al., Sweeny et. al. study coping behaviour and personality as important
measurements of IA (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 347).
Most  other  research focuses  solely  on emotions  and negative affect  as  triggers  of  IA-
behaviour  (e.g.  Afifi  and Afifi  2009;  Fleurkens et.  al.  2014;  Carcioppolo  et.  al.  2016;
Vrinten et. al. 2018). In those cases in which specific emotions are researched, these are
usually fear, anxiety and very rarely disgust (Savolainen 2014, p. 64; Addison 2017, p.
125). Addison identified disinterest as reason for IA as well, believing that it might be the
expression of a subconscious IA desire (Addison 2017, p. 71f.; 127). Of these emotions,
fear and anxiety are the most stable and common predictors of IA (Savolainen 2014, p. 64).
Despite being rarely researched in IA literature, Addison found that disgust, as emotion
centred  upon  the  avoidance  of  undesirable  situations,  leads  also  to  the  avoidance  of
information  about  these  situations  (Addison  2017,  p.  90).  This  result  is  mirrored  by
Savolainen, as he includes examples of emotional based IA that have been identified later
as disgust by Addison (Savolainen 2014, p. 64; Addison 2017, p. 90). However negative
affect can also lead to seeking behaviour (Savolainen 2014, p. 64), sometimes even in
correlation with IA (e.g. McCloud et. al. 2017, p. 357f. Another example where affect leads
to  avoidance  of  some information  and seeking of  others  is  selective  exposure).  In  his
literature review Savolainen found only negative emotions as reasons for IA, even though
positive emotions  still  might  lead  to  filtering  or  satisficing behaviour  (besides  seeking
behaviour. Savolainen 2014, p. 64). This result is not replicated by Sweeny et. al., Golman
et. al., literature on UMT and literature on optimism maintenance, which all include the
preservation  of  positive  emotions  as  a  reason  for  IA (Sweeny  et.  al.  2010,  p.  344;
Carcioppolo et. al. 2016, p. 980; Addison 2017, p. 14; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 110f., 119).
Addison  found  additionally,  that  trust  in  doctors  would  reduce  information  seeking
behaviour (Addison 2017, p. 71f.).  The difference might however be based in different
viewpoints. So could be preservation of positive emotions also be interpreted as avoidance
or fear of negative ones, like doubt, regret and irritation (e.g. Golman et. al. 2017, p. 105-
107, 110. Note that Golman et. al. on p. 119 also include IA unrelated to such negative
feelings). Considering the sometimes negative interpretation of IA (Fleurkens et. al. 2014,
p. 2;  Manheim  2014;  Addison  2017,  p. 144;  Vrinten  et.  al.  2018,  p. 118)  a  focus  on
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negative reasons in the literature Savolainen reviewed might also be possible.
All these reasons for IA have in common, that they are implied to be engaged by conscious
thought and decision (Howell et. al. 2016, p. 816 found similar limitations in their previous
research). While most of these reasons could also influence non-intentional IA, it is worth
exploring this topic on its own. Implicit or automatic IA refers to IA behaviour, that is not
engaged by more  or  less  intentional  thought,  but  rather  by  instant  decisions  based  on
instinct (Ibid., p. 816f.). It is considered to be emotion-based, instead of the cognition-
based explicit avoidance (Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 233) and is believed to employ IA as
instinctual  defensive  reaction  (Howell  and  Shepperd  2013,  p. 1697).  Since  it  is  an
instinctual reaction, people are not necessarily aware of their behaviour (Fleurkens et. al.
2014, p. 2; Howell et. al. 2016, p. 816f.). Importantly these implicit tendencies predict IA
behaviour unrelated to explicit tendencies (Fleurkens et. al. 2014, p. 6; Gaspar et. al. 2016,
p. 544; Howell et. al. 2016, p. 820f.). Probably defined as passive IA by Golman et. al.
(Golman et. al. 2017, p. 97, 103), there were some interesting results in the last years. So
found Howell et. al., that contemplation would lead people to rely more, instead of less on
their implicit preferences (Howell et. al. 2016, p. 820). They also found out, in accordance
with their prior research, that contemplation reduces IA, there still believing that it does so
by increasing dependency upon cognition instead of emotion (Howell and Shepperd 2013,
p. 1701; Howell et. al. 2016, p. 820). Additionally, Woolley and Risen believe that in some
cases  IA is  greater  before a  decision,  instead of after.  By this  they protect  themselves
against temptation to do otherwise (Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 242). While strategical
avoidance to influence decisions was already proven before (Golman et. al. 2017, p. 114;
Woolley and Risen 2018, p. 230f.), Woolley and Risen conclude that people might also
avoid  information  to  rely  upon their  instinctive  preferences  (Woolley  and Risen  2018,
p. 242). However their experiment can be criticised for substituting their control-group on
after-decision behaviour, with a control-group which had the unpleasant decision made for
them (Ibid., p. 10-13).
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Coping Resources and Situational Affect
The former chapter begs the question: Why do these aforementioned reasons sometimes
lead to IA and sometimes to information seeking? While IA was previously often thought
be based upon personal inclinations, and still often is in psychological research with the
exception of IA research, newer research found coping resources, which are changeable
and  are  based  upon  live  situations,  and  situational  affect  far  stronger  and  coherent
predictors (Addison 2017, p. 140f.).
So the short  answer is that people with high coping resources,  a measurement of their
ability to deal with adverse situations, are more likely to engage in seeking behaviour,
while those short on coping resources are more likely to avoid information (Sweeny et. al.
2010, p. 345f.; Howell et. al. 2014, p. 103; Savolainen 2014, p. 64; Vrinten et. al. 2018,
p. 119). Coping resources can be classified into personal coping resources, encompassing
someone’s belief to be able to deal with their problems, and interpersonal coping resources,
which  are  resources  gained  by  possessing  a  network  of  people  (Howell  et.  al.  2014,
p. 103). In contrast to this paper Howell et. al. refer to interpersonal coping resources as
social  support  and  to  coping  resources  overall  as  threat-management  resources  (Ibid.,
p. 103). But since the term threat-management resources is not widespread and both kinds
of resources act in similar ways, coping resources is used in this article as a name for
either. Interestingly, they found that interpersonal and personal coping resources separately
reduce IA and are thus non-additive – having one kind of coping resources was enough to
reduce IA and would not be further modified by reports of the second. In the same article
Howell et. al. showed that both coping resources act in the same way (Ibid., p. 107). While
coping resources are limited, counter-intuitive people with high self-complexity, having
many different aspects of life they are engaged in, actually possess more coping resources
and are less likely to engage in IA. This might be due because coping-resources are at least
partly based upon self-esteem and people can gain energy from aspects of their live which
go well (Sweeny et. al. 2010; p. 345f.), or because certain kinds of IA, selective avoidance
or thought suppression for example, require themselves cognitive effort (Jang 2014, p. 684;
Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 545). Possibly supporting the observation that coping resources are
based on self-esteem, in a study done by Howell and Shepperd self-affirmation reduced
following IA behaviour. This can either be because self-affirmation increases self-esteem
or because it reduces the perceived threat of the information. This effect could even be
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observed, when the self-affirmation was used in a completely different area (Howell and
Shepperd 2012, p. 141, 144). However it is only effective, as long as people are unaware
that they are manipulated (Howell and Shepperd 2013, p. 1967). Coping resources might
also affect IA indirectly, by influencing tendencies. For example, in one study, people with
low social support preferred online sources with social narratives (Addison 2017, p. 20).
Situational affect both influences IA directly, in addition to influencing coping resources.
Therefore  it  has  as  much  impact  upon the  decision  to  engage  in  IA as  direct  coping
resources. IA can be increased by tiredness, distractions, stress and other kinds of pressure
(most aware is the NFCC-research of this correlation: Acar-Burkay 2014, p. 732; Roets et.
al.  2015,  p. 223;  Brizi  2018,  p. 2).  Vrinten  et.  al.  showed  that  fear  mostly  leads  in
combination with high stress to IA. If either one of was low, significantly less IA behaviour
was found (Vrinten et.  al.  2018, p.  124f.).  Interestingly,  both these factors can lead to
increased as well as decreased IA (Jang 2014, p. 684). This is probably based upon whether
IA or information seeking requires more cognitive effort.  Another important situational
factor is (perceived) threat and control, leading to the avoidance of more threatening or
unchangeable / untreatable information. This behaviour lead Dawson et. al. 2006 to the
theory, that IA is based upon the (perceived) relevance and (perceived) changeability of an
information (Dawson et. al. 2006, p. 751-753; Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 345 saw control as
reason for IA as well).  However they also note that people would often not be able to
determine the changeability of information and thus come to incorrect conclusions, based
upon their flawed knowledge. Prime example would be a missing understanding of the
difference between untreatable and incurable (Dawson et.  al.  2006, p. 764f.).  Similarly,
Golman et. al. state that people, despite common beliefs, often deal better with knowing
the worst, instead of suspecting the worst. This misconception of their own preferences
often leads people to choose for themselves undesirable IA behaviour (Golman et. al. 2017,
p. 107-109). Threat is often measured by closeness, including emotional, geographically
and social, as such people or their opinions are more likely to influence oneself and are
thus perceived as having higher relevance (Menon et. al. 2006; Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 343;
Freddi 2017; Howell  et.  al.  2019).  This leads to another form of situational affect,  the
presence of others during the disclosure of the information.  These were highlighted by
Sweeny et. al. as insufficient researched area (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 349). Even though
there is some research that social stigma and opinions of others lead to IA (Dawson et. al.
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2006, p. 764; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 119), they are still only rarely touched upon.
Other  factors  that  can  influence  IA are  confirmation  bias,  positive  bias  as  well  as
groupthink and group-centrism. All four theories were explained earlier and contain the
rejection of information non-compatible with their current world-view. While they can act
as reason for IA, they are already encompassed by Sweeny et. al.'s avoidance of belief-
change. Thus they are here only mentioned due to their influence on other kinds of IA.
Notably, they can also result from other IA behaviour, e.g. confirmation bias might be the
result of prior avoidance.
36
Appearances of Information Avoidance
Conform to the belief that IA is employed in everyday life (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 347,
349), the forms it can take are many indeed. The first manifestation to be explored should
be  source  selection,  as  it  can  be  seen  both  as  result,  as  well  as  impact  factor  of  IA
behaviour (Savolainen 2014, p. 64: Addison 2017, p. 4f., 134). Source selection, which is
following Manheim originally an area of satisficing research, is based upon the decisions
which sources will be selected (Manheim 2014). Sources in this context is defined broadly,
as any medium of information is a potential source, humans not the last. The sources are
judged on professionalism, understandability, validity, media type, existence of a personal
narrative  or  social  closeness.  These  judgement  are  person  dependent,  as  some  people
would  avoid  information  from  too  professional  sources,  fearing  that  they  could  not
understand it or that it might be too unspecific, while other people seek them out (Addison
2017,  p. 19-21,  134f.).  Menon  et.  al.  found  out  that  businesspersons  prefer  to  gain
information from rivals outside of their company instead of within. They concluded that
most likely rivals within the company posses a greater immediate threat and such their
information is avoided, while information from outside is desired (Menon et. al. 2006).
Another variety that influences other IA behaviour is mental IA. Mental IA is an umbrella
term that encompasses any behaviour intended to avoid already known information. Thus
researchers following Sweeny et. al. – and probably Manheim as well – wouldn't define it
it as IA, since mental IA only deals with information that was not avoided in the first place
(Sweeny et.  al.  2010, p.  342;  Howell  et.  al.  2014, p.  102f.;  Manheim 2014).  However
Golman et. al. include some examples that would fall under mental IA, mainly intentional
forgetting  or  misinterpretation,  as  well  as  biased  interpretation  of  information.  The
reasoning behind mental IA is that actively not considering information that is already
known, is just as much IA as avoiding the reception of the information in the first place
(Golman et.  al.  2017, p.  99-103). Roets et.  al.  conclude that people high in NFCC, or
through other motivational factors, are more likely to remember information that support a
schema-consistent information, while they are less likely to remember schema-inconsistent
or undesired information. This is known as the Retrieval Practice Paradigm and might be
caused by subconsciously suppressing competing information to better recall desired ones.
Such behaviour might even lead to the recall of imagined memories (Roets et. al. 2015, p.
241-243). However there is some literature, that questions the efficiency of such mental IA
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behaviour. Thought suppression is a possible form of mental IA. According to its literature,
by  suppressing  the  thoughts  about  something,  an  interior  monitoring  process  must  be
employed. Thus the suppression of thoughts leads them to be more easily accessible, once
the suppression is stopped (Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 545).
Self-Regulation, a term used by Addison, refers to behaviour intended to limit the exposure
of  information.  Self-regulation has  according to  Addison many similarities to  selective
exposure,  since  information  is  avoided  for  fear  of  negative  affect  and  it  is  used  as  a
protective mechanism to prevent information overload. Thus self-regulation as Addison
uses it is based upon her understanding of IA as filtering, a topic that was attributed by
Manheim to information overload research (Manheim 2014). The main method Addison
found for self-regulation was the limitation of time for seeking, followed by avoidance of
specific content or negative affect (Addison 2017, p. 86-92, 128). However, self-regulation
has other forms, of which some are also part of IA when using stricter definitions. Golman
et. al. classified self-handicapping as a variation of IA. Self-handicapping refers to harmful
behaviour, in which people decrease their own abilities or engage in tasks mismatched to
their abilities, to avoid learning of a potential limit to them. Thus they can retain their
former self-view, despite indications to believe otherwise. So found one study cited by
Golman et. al. out that people, after taking a difficult test which they passed well despite
expectations,  were more inclined to  take ability  debilitating drugs before a second test
(Golman et. al. 2017, p. 130f.).
Thematically, similar to self-handicapping is the coping strategy of seeking refuge within
substance abuse. While not researched by the IA literature itself, it is seen in behaviour
medicine as one of the potential forms of avoidance coping (Wiebe 2013, p. 169f.). Since
IA refers to a specific form of avoidance that can lead to many of the other forms of
avoidance coping, it is more than likely that substance abuse could also result from an
attempt to avoid information.
Another form of IA found by Addison is delegation. To avoid information, or at least filter
them, the receiving of these information can be delegated to another person. This person
acts then as a filter and passes then only those information on, that they consider as non-
threatening or too important to ignore.  Addison emphasis that such delegation was not
intended for seeking behaviour, but rather for avoidance of information, for example of
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frightening medical procedures. In most cases such information needs were delegated to
family  members,  as  such social  contacts  are  easily  accessible  and would  know which
information the recipient would want to avoid. However some people tended more to pick
medical personnel, possible because they found their professionalism reassuring (Addison
2017, p. 128f.).
Lastly Addison mentions filtering as a form of IA, referring to the selective avoidance of
only the most unwanted information (Ibid., p. 126). Filtering would not be a form of IA
according to  Manheim,  but  rather  an aspect  of  information overload (Manheim 2014).
Addison encompasses under filtering, both of the aforementioned forms, as well as many
of  the  more  common  applications  of  IA.  Here  mainly  physical  avoidance  and  the
controlling of the conversation (Addison 2017, p. 3, 129f.).
Physical  Avoidance  refers  to  any  IA,  in  which  physical  absence  is  used  to  avoid
information. Physical Avoidance can be planned ahead, by re-routing around an unwanted
information, or spontaneously, by physical leaving a conversation or other locally confined
distribution of information (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 341; Addison 2017, p. 3; Golman et. al.
2017, p. 99f.).
Controlling the conversation refers to actively steering a conversation, to avoid disclosure
of unwanted information. Often researched in topic avoidance, this  area encompass both
avoidance of topics for fear of new information, as well as fear of sharing certain known
information.  Thus topic avoidance and IA overlap only partially (Afifi  and Afifi  2009,
p. 489f.; Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 341; Addison 2017, p. 3; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 127).
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Future research questions
Information can not only be avoided by leaving a conversation or actively re-routing it, but
also by failing to engage in information searching. This failure of engagement is coined by
Sweeny  et.  al.  as  passive  IA and  refers  to  any  behaviour  in  which  the  gaining  of
information is bound to effort instead of the avoidance. Therefore Golman et. al. exclude
this kind of passive avoidance in their review. Their understanding of passive IA seems
more  similar  to  Implicit  Avoidance,  however  they  never  define  it  directly.  Passive
Avoidance is only insufficiently researched, as most researchers either focus on all kinds of
avoidance or solely active avoidance (for examples of the later see Howell and Shepperd
2012 and Howell et. al. 2016). Consequently both Sweeny et. al., as well as Afifi and Afifi,
a pair of researchers from topic avoidance, called for more research on this topic (Afifi and
Afifi 2009, p. 507; Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 349). The only study partly concerning passive
IA was done by Andreoni et. al. (2017). Andreoni et. al. researched moral avoidance, by
placing members of the Salvation Army before one or two entrances of a super market.
They also instructed the Salvation Army members to either be silent or ask with a specific,
non-informative phrase for donations, resulting in four different scenarios (Andreoni et. al.
2017, p. 627f., 631f.). While their experiment was flawed, as the supermarket had a third
exit which they noticed only after the experiment was over (Ibid., p. 629, 633), their results
were telling enough to show that some people avoided donating by using another exit,
while others tried to ignore the Salvation Army, thus engaging in passive avoidance (Ibid.,
p. 628f.).
Another area that Sweeny et. al. highlighted in 2010 as an insufficiently researched area is
the influence that the presence of others or the social context of a person have on that
person's IA behaviour (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 349). Still there is already some research,
that social stigma and opinions of others lead to IA, some of it being referenced already
before Sweeny et. al. published their article (Dawson et. al. 2006, p. 764; Golman et. al.
2017, p. 119). In contrast Golman et. al. exclude these in their review on IA, as they are
motivated by “wanting  others to remain uninformed”, instead of oneself (Golman et. al.
2017.,  p. 119).  Similarly,  there  is  also  much  research  concerning  that  people  who  are
closer, geographically or emotionally, are viewed as more threatening, some of it already
being referenced by Sweeny et. al. themselves (Menon et. al. 2006; Sweeny et. al. 2010,
p. 343; Freddi 2017; Howell et. al. 2019). Only the presence of others during disclosure
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itself was rarely directly researched. A specific instance is Golman et. al.'s intrapersonal
strategic IA, in which IA is openly used to influence other people. Besides this instance,
people can not only be viewed as threatening, but they can also provide social support, i.e.
interpersonal coping resources. Thus there is much research that predicts the influence that
the presence of others has on IA, but little research that actually focusses on it.
An aspect of IA that is under-represented as well in literature is temporal IA. Temporal IA
refers to any IA behaviour, that is only employed for a time, before the information is
engaged. Temporal IA is acknowledged by some researchers (e.g. Howell and Shepperd
2012, p. 144; Golman et. al. 2017, p. 106) and Sweeny et. al. highlighted it as an open
research field (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 349). However currently, almost no research can be
found  in  IA literature.  Gaspar  et.  al.  (2016)  and  McCloud  et.  al.  (2017)  researched
avoidance of warnings against red meat or smoking. Both came to the conclusion that
despite IA behaviour exhibited by the recipients of the warnings, they actually received the
threatening  information.  Gaspar  et.  al.  found  that  perceived  knowledge  about  and
perception  of  red  meat  changed  nearly  equally  for  both  people  who  avoided  the
information and people who did not (Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 544), while McCloud et. al.
discovered a positive correlation between IA and information seeking related to smoking
cessation. McCloud et. al. assumed that IA and information seeking were both reactions
upon negative affect and that the first contact with a cigarette warning label would have
had the greatest impact on it. Since such a first contact could not be reliably avoided, the
increase of negative affect despite otherwise intended efforts made sense. This negative
affect would lead ultimately to seeking behaviour, a result conform with their literature
(McCloud  et.  al.  2017,  p.  375f.).  While  both  studies  show  that  the  information  was
received, despite efforts to avoid it, they did not research if these avoidance was intended
to be only temporal. Actually  Gaspar et. al.  imply the opposite, having done additional
interviews  after  a  two week time frame.  Gaspar  et.  al.  only  tested  for  IA in  the  first
questionnaire,  however.  The  later  interviews  controlled  solely  for  attitude  toward  and
knowledge of red meat  instead of avoidance (Gaspar  et.  al.  2016, p. 536f.,  539).  Thus
constant IA was assumed, but not verified. However there is a rich area of health research,
which also concerns temporal IA. Research on recognition delay, most of it focussed upon
cancer recognition, explores which factors influence the time until a disease is identified.
While this research is focussed upon delays of the whole recognition process, including
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wrong diagnoses and the time needed to be transferred from a general practitioner to a
hospital or specialist (Mitchell et. al. 2008, p. 61; Moodley et. al. 2018), IA is among the
factors that delay the first visit to a doctor. Namely these factors include denial and fear of
confirmation. Unlike the assumptions from IA research, these reasons appear actually quite
small in comparison to others (Forbes et. al. 2014, p. 582f.; Moodley et. al. 2018, p. 4, 6.),
even though IA had often a significant correlation with the duration of delay (Mitchell et.
al. 2008, p. 62; Moodley et. al. 2018, p. 5). However this might have some methodological
reasons. Firstly research on IA is rarely referenced in recognition delay, despite including
IA as one of the possible factors of delay (e.g. Forbes et. al. 2014; Moodley et. al. 2018).
Secondly most of these studies are done through questionnaires or interviews with (cancer)
survivors, after different intervals from the initial diagnosis and treatment (Mitchell et. al.
2008, p. 61; Forbes et. al. 2014; Moodley et. al. 2018, notably p. 10). These self reports are
quite vulnerable to reporting errors or wrong memories, especially since IA is still often
considered a maladaptive behaviour (Fleurkens et. al. 2014, p. 2; Manheim 2014; Addison
2017, notably p. 26f., 139). Given the context, a perception of IA as maladaptive is very
likely within the interviewees, so that IA was possible reported as less influential as it is in
reality (Addison 2017, p. 139; Moodley et. al. 2018, p. 10). Despite these problems, this is
one of the few areas of research, that contain results concerning temporal IA.
As mentioned, both Gaspar et.  al.  and McCloud et.  al.  have shown that even if people
engage  in  IA,  they  still  might  gain  unwanted  information.  Their  results  fit  well  with
research on selective exposure, thought suppression and avoidance coping, which prove
that these behaviours require cognitive effort and are therefore draining to keep active over
longer time (Wiebe 2013, p. 169f.; Jang 2014, p. 684; Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 545). Hence
the  question  how well  people  actually  can  avoid  information  would  be  an  interesting
subject for research. However both cited examples are limited in their application. This
was  researched  by  Gaspar  et.  al.  in  an  artificial  environment,  as  they  forced  their
participants to engage with the disliked information, instead of measuring the success of
their avoidance in real life circumstances (Gaspar et. al. 2016, p. 539). McCloud et. al. on
the other hand studied only the specific instance of avoidance of cigarette warning labels,
which is extraordinary well researched due to its detrimental factors to personal health (for
examples  see McCloud et.  al.  2017,  p. 352).  But  besides  this  topic,  little  research  has
focused upon the difficulties of keeping IA active over time. Applicable literature on this
42
behaviour might be found however within research on advertisement avoidance. This form
of  avoidance  is  usually  excluded  from  definitions  of  IA,  as  it  focuses  on  not  only
unwanted,  but  also  unneeded  information.  But  since  it  examines  information  that  are
omnipresent and often avoided, results might apply to IA as well.
Positive IA is also rarely touched upon in IA research, despite being mentioned in almost
every article (e.g. in Sweeny et.  al.  2010, p. 350; Manheim 2014; Howell et.  al.  2016,
p. 820;  Addison 2017,  p. 144;  Golman et.  al.  2017,  p.  98f.,  124;  Howell  et.  al.  2019,
p. 153). Probably researchers are either more interested in IA that can be improved or in
exhaustive research that is not limited to a specific area. The only example of research on
positive IA is from Eriksson and Helgesson. In 2006, they created a questionnaire, intended
to indirectly and through this covertly check for IA preferences before studies. Based on
the answers people should only get as many information as they desire or necessarily need.
Stealth was employed to avoid false answers due to the negative perception of IA (Eriksson
and Helgesson 2006). While this questionnaire is by Eriksson and Helgesson's admission
faulty (Ibid., p. 676f.), it is still one of the few attempts to capture IA desire in a neutral or
positive context. However research on positive IA might itself be quite relevant, at least to
challenge the assumptions of IA as maladaptive (Fleurkens et.  al.  2014, p. 2; Manheim
2014;  Addison  2017,  notably  p.  29).  Following  Tuominen  (2004),  Manheim  (2014)
identified the research field of moral obligation for (health) information seeking behaviour.
Tuominen et. al. had found that heart surgery patients felt forced to engage in certain health
information behaviour, to not be seen by the staff as maladaptive and unhealthy (Tuominen
2004; Manheim 2014). This moral obligation is also propagated in research on consumer
health,  whose  critics  found  similar  results  as  Tuominen.  However  unlike  Tuominen's
interviewees 2004, patients in consumer health were forced to seek information, instead of
being compelled to leave it to their doctors. Thus critics of consumer health refer to this
need to seek as “health work”, instead of seeing is as empowering like consumer health
research  does  (Tuominen  2004;  Addison  2017,  p. 26-28).  Considering  how  most
researchers highlight their belief that IA can also be helpful, research upon when this is
actually the case and in which situations people feel forced to engage in seeking despite
their better judgement, would not only increase our understanding of IA, but also have
direct applications in health care.
While there are theories of how IA behaviour is influenced by groups, namely groupthink
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and group-centrism, there is no theory that tries to predict IA outside of a specific closed
off  group.  The  closest  research  on  this  topic  comes  in  the  form  of  a  German
communication  study  by  Geiß  (2015).  In  this  study  Geiß  focused  upon  mass  media
reception  in  society,  researched by respectively  three  telephone surveys  on  three  main
topics of the time. Geiß found interesting results about IA, mainly no direct connection to
information seeking, but he used no IA literature published after 2000. Thus his definition
of IA was still based upon cognitive-dissonance theory, the precursor theory of selective
exposure (Geiß  2015).  Though these results  mirror  those  of  current  selective exposure
research,  the  question  how  IA might  be  employed  by  and  in  populations  was  never
exhaustively answered.
Lastly Golman et. al. mentions the possibility of IA behaviour in animals (Golman et. al.
2017, p. 96) unlike Sweeny et. al., which still assumed “humans unique ability to mental
time travel” (Sweeny et. al. 2010, p. 350) as a likely reason for IA. Golman et. al. base
their assumption, which they only include as a side note, on Jenkins and Boakes (1973),
who tested the reaction of pigeons to stimuli. They found that the pigeons learned to ignore
negative  stimuli,  which  were  those  that  were  only  given  when  no food was  available
(Jenkins and Boakes 1973, p. 206). Golman et. al. believed this to be a possible form of IA.
This  topic  was never  further explored,  but might lead to  a better  understanding of the
baselines  of  IA.  Either  by  comparing  interspecies  behaviour  or  by  finding  a  distinct
boundary of what IA entails.
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Conclusion
As explained, the understanding of IA varies widely between different researchers. These
variations are mirrored in the possible appearances that may or may not be IA, based upon
the understanding of the researcher in question. So is it impossible to give a single coherent
definition of what IA actually is. There are to many varying trends and understandings of
IA, often overlapping with each other, to give a more precise confinement than the literal
meaning of the words. Thus IA remains as the avoidance of information. Which kinds of
avoidance  fall  under  IA and their  specific  names  are  still  different  from researcher  to
researcher.
Despite this the research at large has begone to intermingle, with researchers from different
areas  working together  on  shared  articles.  Promoting  such collaboration  was  the  main
intent of Manheim's and Sweeny et. al.'s articles. Furthermore some underlying trends can
be identified. For example, IA is seen to be more often predicted by situations, rather than
fixed traits.  In addition,  over time IA is  becoming more and more accepted as neutral
behaviour, instead of being seen as negative. Both developments are still mostly confined
to the direct research on IA however. Partly responsible for the impossibility of a single
definition, is the fact that IA research is including an increasing number of topics formerly
belonging  to  other  areas  of  non-seeking-behaviour.  Thus  a  revision  of  Manheim's
framework might be useful, to understand the exact extent to which these topics shift and
to identify possible similar developments in the other two areas.
Lastly, there are many theories and areas of IA that are rarely touched upon by direct IA
research.  Many  of  these  theories  are  used  in  the  context  of  different  topics,  which
sometimes including IA as an influential behaviour. Such research might benefit from the
application of the specific expertise of IA research to their theoretical framework. Further
unexplored areas of IA research are already mentioned in the section on future research
questions, including reasoning about their importance.
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